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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
RAMON SEVILLA, #90-A-9500,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2012-0283.71
INDEX # 2012-587
ORI #NY016015J

-against-

ANDREA EVANS, Chairwoman,
of the New York State Board of Parole,
Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Ramon Sevilla, verified on July 3, 2012 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on July 9, 2012. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the June 2011 determination denying him
parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The Court issued an
Order to Show Cause on July 13, 2012 and has received and reviewed respondent’s
Answer and Return, including in camera materials, verified on July 29, 2012, as well as
the August 29, 2012 Letter Memorandum of Glen Francis Michaels, Esq., Assistant
Attorney General in Charge, submitted on behalf of the respondent. The Court has
received no Reply thereto from petitioner.
On July 11, 1990 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, Bronx County, as a
persistent violent felony offender, to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years to life upon
his conviction of the crime of Attempted Robbery 1°. Petitioner’s 1990
conviction/sentencing was affirmed on direct appeal to the Appellate Division, First
Department. People v. Sevilla, 182 AD2d 454, lv den 80 NY2d 837. It is noted that
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petitioner was at liberty under parole supervision from a prior (1983) robbery conviction
at the time he committed the criminal act underlying his 1990 Bronx County conviction.
It is further noted that petitioner was at liberty under parole supervision from a prior
(1976) manslaughter conviction at the time he committed the criminal act underlying his
1983 conviction.
After petitioner’s 1990 Bronx County conviction/sentencing he was first released
from DOCCS custody to parole supervision in June of 2003. Following a sustained parole
violation and the imposition of a 12-month delinquent time assessment petitioner was rereleased to parole supervision in June of 2006. His parole release, however, was
ultimately revoked, with a sustained delinquency date of June 10, 2008, following a final
parole revocation hearing conducted on October 9, 2008. Another 12-month delinquent
time assessment was imposed and petitioner was returned to DOCCS custody as a parole
violator. On July 21, 2009, apparently upon expiration of the 12-month delinquent time
assessment, petitioner appeared before a Parole Board for a parole violator reappearance
interview. See 9 NYCRR §8002.6(d)(2). Following that interview he was denied parole
release and directed to be held for an additional 24 months. The 2009 parole denial
determination reads, in relevant part, as follows:
“AFTER A CARFUL REVIEW OF THE RECORD, THIS INTERVIEW AND
DUE DELIBERATION, PAROLE IS DENIED FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS. YOU ARE CURRENTLY SERVING A LIFE SENTENCE UPON
YOUR CONVICTION OF ATT. ROBBERY 1ST. YOU WERE RELEASED TO
THE COMMUNITY AND HAVE NOW BEEN RETURNED TO THE STATE
FACILITY ON YOUR 2ND VIOLATION. DURING YOUR 12 MONTH HOLD
YOU HAVE USED DRUGS IN THE FACILITY. CLEARLY YOU ARE ILL
PREPARED FOR RELEASE AT THIS TIME.
ALL FACTORS
CONSIDERED, THE PANEL CONCLUDES THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS
TIME THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD
NOT LIVE AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE
LAW. THEREFORE EARLY RELEASE IS DENIED.”
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Petitioner re-appeared before a Parole Board for discretionary release
consideration on June 29, 2011. Following that appearance parole was again denied and
petitioner was directed to be held for an additional 24 months. The 2011 parole denial
determination, which is the subject of this proceeding, reads as follows:
“AFTER A CARFUL REVIEW OF YOUR RECORD, PERSONAL
INTERVIEW, AND DELIBERATION, PAROLE IS DENIED. THIS PANEL
REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR LENGTHY CRIMINAL HISTORY
DATING BACK TO 1971, INCLUDING PRIOR ROBBERY AND
MANSLAUGHTER CRIMES. YOU ARE SERVING 10 YEARS TO LIFE FOR
ATT. ROBBERY 1ST. IN 1989 YOU COMMITTED A GUNPOINT ROBBERY.
WHEN APPROACHED BY A POLICE OFFICER YOU STRUCK THE
OFFICER IN THE FACE WITH YOUR GUN CAUSING A LACERATION.
YOU WERE ON PAROLE AT THE TIME OF THE INSTANT OFFENSE.
THIS IS YOUR 3RD STATE PRISON TERM. YOUR VIOLENT ACTIONS
ARE A CONCERN FOR THIS PANEL. YOUR INSTITUTIONAL
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND RELEASE PLANS ARE NOTED. YOU HAVE
MAINTAINED A CLEAN DISCIPLINARY RECORD SINCE 2009. IF
RELEASED AT THIS TIME, THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY
THAT YOU WOULD NOT LIVE AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT
VIOLATING THE LAW. YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME IS
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE AND SAFETY OF THE
COMMUNITY.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the 2011 parole denial
determination was received by the DOCCS/Board of Parole Appeals Unit on December 2,
2011. The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue its findings and recommendation within
the four month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c)1. This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
1

A belated decision on administrative appeal was issued after this proceeding had been commenced.
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pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . .(iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
Petitioner argues, in effect, that the June 29, 2011 Parole Board unlawfully
considered the nature of the crime underlying his 1990 conviction as well as his prior
criminal record. According to petitioner these two factors were taken into consideration
when he was first released to parole supervision in 2003 and on both occasions when his
parole was revoked and 12-month delinquent time assessments were imposed. Although
petitioner concedes that his violation of the standards of inmate behavior while serving
the second delinquent time assessment supported the determination requiring his
appearance at a parole violator re-appearance interview on July 21, 2009 (see 9 NYCRR
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§8002.6(d)(2)(iii)(a)), as well as the 24-month hold imposed following such interview,
he goes on to assert that during the course of the 24-month hold (leading up to the
June 29, 2011 Parole Board appearance) he completed the six-month DOCCS Alcohol and
Substance Abuse Treatment (ASAT) program and maintained a clean disciplinary record.
According to petitioner the July 21, 2009 parole denial determination, issued following
the parole violator reappearance interview, did not focus on the nature of the crime
underlying his 1990 conviction or prior criminal record but, rather, upon his violation of
his standards of inmate behavior by marijuana use while serving the 12-month delinquent
time assessment. Petitioner goes on to argue as follows:
“Then, once this petitioner kept a clean disciplinary record and completed
ASAT, this most recent Board in June 2011 did not have any other reasons
except to revert to the previously decided nature of the crime and past
criminal history . . . [T]hat is just what this panel [Parole board] did. It
turned a 12-month time assessment into a 36-month hold based on this
Petitioner’s drug infraction . . . Then, once this petitioner addressed that
issue the Respondent created a completely different reason in the 2011
Parole Board hearing, ultimately re-sentencing this Petitioner to a total of
a 60-month hold.”
Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, this Court finds no basis
to conclude that a Parole Board considering an inmate for discretionary parole release
after such inmate had already been released on parole, returned to custody as a parole
violator and held beyond his/her delinquent time assessment following a parole violator
reappearance interview, is precluded from considering all of the factors set forth in
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), including the nature/seriousness of the offense underlying
the inmate’s incarceration as well as his/her prior criminal record/parole violation(s)
(Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii) and (viii).
A Parole Board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required
to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
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expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision. See Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to
assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether
the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is
supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the record. Nor could we effectively
review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that
it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary
institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295,
1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, reviews of the Inmate Status Report and transcript of the
June 29, 2011 Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it information
with respect to the appropriate statutory factors including petitioner’s therapeutic and
vocational programming, clean disciplinary record since 2009 and release plans, in
addition to the circumstances of the crime underlying his incarceration and prior criminal
record. See Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. In view of the above, the Court finds no basis
to conclude that the parole board failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See
McAllister v. New York State Division of Parole 78 AD3d 1413, lv den 16 NY3d 707, and
Davis v. Lemons, 73 AD3d 1354. Since the requisite statutory factors were considered,
and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary parole denial
determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the 2011 parole denial
determination was affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety as a result of the
emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crime underlying petitioner’s
incarceration and his prior criminal record/parole violation(s). See Perez v. Evans, 76
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AD3d 1130, Hall v. New York State Division of Parole, 66 AD3d 1322 and White v.
Dennison, 29 AD3d 1144.
Petitioner’s argument to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court also finds that the
2011 parole denial determination was sufficiently detailed to inform petitioner of the
reasons underlying the denial and to facilitate judicial review thereof. See Comfort v.
New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295 and Ek v. Travis, 20 AD3d 667, lv dis
5 NY3d 862; cf. Vaello v. Parole Board Division of State of New York, 48 AD3d 1018.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

December 11, 2012 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice

7 of 7

